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CHAOS AND CONSTRAINTS 
HOWARD NYE 
Introduction 
Chaos theory tells us that our world exhibits "sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions," or that small changes at any point can lead to 
dramatically different outcomes. These have become known as "butterfly 
effects," after Edward Lorenz's vivid example of "the flap of a butterfly's 
wings in Brazil set[ ting] off a tornado in Texas."1 Laura Cannon suggested 
that the pervasiveness of these effects might be morally important when 
she "consider[ed] the plight of Lorenz's butterfly," and "wondered how a 
butterfly might feel if it had the mental capacities to comprehe~d Loren~'s 
discovery. What sense of responsibility might it feel, knowmg that _its 
movement might be the cause of great suffering? Might some butterflies 
sit paralyzed on the branch in an attempt to avoid being the cause of such 
harm?"2 
Cannon, following Samuel Scheffler (1995), claimed that the far-
reaching effects of our economic decisions create trouble for commonsense 
notions of responsibility. But I believe that Cannon and Scheffler 
underappreciated the pervasiveness of the problem that butterfly. e~~e~ts 
pose for views according to which we have stronger moral respons1b1ht1es 
to avoid causing harm ourselves than we have to prevent harms that w?uld 
occur in the absence of our interference. In this paper I argue that, given 
the harmful butterfly effects our actions are likely to have, all plausible 
theories of agent-centered constraints on harming entail that we must sit 
paralyzed-or kill ourselves-in order to avoi? causing harm.3 I believe 
that this result is extremely important for ethical theory. Shelly Kagan, 
Frank Jackson and Michael Smith have argued that absolute constraints 
against inflicti~g serious harms on innocents regardless of the benefits of 
doing so lead to paralysis under conditions of risk.4 But to man~ ?f u_s, ~he 
most plausible constraints on harming are not absolute. Even 1f 1~fl1ctmg 
harm is significantly harder to justify than failing to prevent harm, it seems 
that we should still be permitted to painlessly kill one individual to save 
the rest of the world's billions from dying the most excruciating deaths 
imaginable. I shall argue, however, that the likelihood that our actions will 
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have dramatic butterfly effects undermines all plausible non-absolutist 
understandings of constraints, according to which it is harder but not 
impossible to justify inflicting serious harms.5 
1. An Overview of the Argument 
My argument begins with the observation that for any way we might 
sustain our lives, we will have to perform some set of actions, A, of which 
it is reasonable to believe that some members will have butterfly effects. 
As chaos theory shows, it is not just the consumption choices of 
westerners in a global economy that can lead to dramatically different 
outcomes. The most non-intrusive existence that could sustain our lives-
say that of a hermit who expends minimal effort tending his garden before 
dutifully returning to the fetal position-will run a far greater risk of 
causing a dramatic cascade of events than Lorenz's butte1fly. The minimal 
life-sustaining actions our hermit must perform, repeated millions of times 
over the course of his life, will make it virtually certain that his actions 
will somewhere make things dramatically more different than they would 
have been had he not performed them. In fact, it is reasonable to believe 
that his actions over the course of his life will have many such effects. 
Because butterfly effects result in such dramatic events as tornadoes, it 
is reasonable to believe that at least some of these effects of A will make 
some individuals worse off and others better off than they would have 
been had A not been performed. Call the former the "butterfly effect harms 
of A," or BH(A), and call the latter the "butterfly effect benefits of A," or 
IJB(A). It is, in particular, reasonable to believe that for any acts A that 
could sustain our lives, there will be at least some deaths in BH(A) and 
some life-savings in BB(A). Such are the results of causing and preventing 
such momentous events as tornadoes. There is, however, no reason to 
believe that BB(A) will tend to be either greater or less than BH(A). As 
such, it is reasonable to expect that BB(A) will on average be about equal 
lo BH(A). 
If the beneficial upshots of our conduct were able to justify the harmful 
upshots, so long as the benefits were equal to or greater than the harms, 
!hen the expected butterfly effect benefits in BB(A) would exactly justify 
lhc expected butterfly effect harms in BH(A), and we could-as it seems 
we should- treat the unpredictable butterfly effects of our actions as 
something we can ignore for practical purposes. But agent-centered 
t:onstraints on harming hold that some harmful upshots of our conduct 
t:annot be justified by equal or somewhat greater benefits. These 
t:onstraints hold, for instance, that the benefits of saving five individuals 
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from dying of organ failure cannot justify the harms we would cause to 
one healthy individual by removing her organs and transplanting them into 
the five.6 But if the harms our conduct inflicts on some cannot be justified 
by the equal or somewhat greater benefits it brings to others, there is a 
serious worry that for any course of action A that would be needed to 
sustain our lives, BH(A) cannot be justified by BB(A). 
One way to prevent butterfly effects from making trouble for agent-
centered constraints on harming would be to claim that these constraints 
make it difficult to justify inflicting only those harms we intend. I will 
argue that this is implausible in Section 2, but for now I simply note that 
most proponents of agent-centered constraints hold-plausibly-that the 
benefits of saving fi ve cannot justify certain ways of causing foreseen but 
unintended harms to one, like running her over if this is the only way to 
reach the five in time to save them from drowning.7 Another way to 
prevent butterfly effects from making trouble for constraints on harming 
would be to claim that these constraints make it difficult to justify actions 
only if they are "proximate" causes of harm, or if we can foresee who the 
victims of these actions will be. I will argue that this is implausible in 
Section 3, but for now I simply suggest that most proponents of constraints 
will hold- plausibly-that somewhat greater benefits cannot justify 
certain ways of causing harm distally or to unknown victims. These would 
presumably include saving five by pulling a trigger that sets off an 
elaborate Rube-Goldberg device that kills one, or sets off a device that 
fires thousands of rifles at thousands of victims, an unknown one of which 
is loaded with live ammunition. 
If this is right, then any plausible theory of agent-centered constraints 
on harming will hold that the infliction of certain unintended distal harms 
cannot be justified by equal or somewhat greater benefits. I will argue in 
Section 4 that because of the drastic nature of butterfly effects, it is 
reasonable to believe that some of these difficult-to-justify harms will be 
among the butterfly effect harms in BH(A). Because each benefit in BB(A) 
is needed to justify a corresponding harm of equal magnitude in BH(A), 
this will mean that some deaths in BH(A) will remain unjustified by life-
savings and other reasonably expected benefits in BB(A) . So all plausible 
theories of constraints on harming will hold that for any way we could 
sustain our lives, the butterfly effects of our actions can be expected to kill 
others in ways that cannot be justified by the lives they will save. 
Moreover, I observe in Section 5 that on any plausible theory of 
constraints on harming, the benefits of saving oneself and N individuals 
are insufficient to justify killing N other innocent individuals in ways that 
are difficult to justify. If this is right, then all otherwise plausible theories 
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or a.gent-~entered constraints on harming entail that we are morally 
required either to allow ourselves to waste away or kill ourselves. This, I 
argue, undermines the plausibility of agent-centered constraints on 
harming. 
2. Constraints Against Only Intended Harm? 
Once we know about butterfly effects, we can foresee with reasonable 
certainty that if we act to sustain our lives, we will make some individuals 
worse ?ff than they would have been. As I mentioned, one way to deny 
~ha~ this makes trouble for agent-centered constraints on harming is to 
ms1st that these constraints make it difficult to justify causing only those 
harms we intend, while harms we merely foresee can be justified by the 
equal or slightly greater benefits of causing them. Although a few authors 
have suggested something like this view of agent-centered constraints 8 I 
think they fail to appreciate how unattractive it really is. If we r~ad 
"intending harm" literally, then you need to intend a victim to suffer the 
harm of death only if her dying plays a causal role in what you aim at. But 
then a prohibition against causing only intended harm would permit you to 
save five individuals dying of organ failure by harvesting the organs of 
one healthy individual while she is alive, since her dying as a result of 
your removing her organs would be a byproduct that plays no role in 
saving the five.9 This would seem to undermine the entire motivation for 
believing in agent-centered constraints on harming. 
If, on the other hand, we interpret "intending harm" a bit less strictly, as 
something like intending a harmful effect on someone's body or intending 
someone to instantiate a property that ends up harming her, then you must 
intend harm in harvesting the organs of one to save five, although you 
need not intend harm in driving over one individual trapped in the road to 
save five others from drowning. 10 But because it seems about as abhorrent 
to knowingly run over one to save five as to harvest her organs to save 
them, this understanding of constraints against only causing intended 
harm, which prohibits the latter but permits the former, also seems to 
undermine the entire motivation for believing in agent-centered constraints 
on harming. 
To appreciate the absurdity of such a theory of constraints, consider the 
following cases: 
Less Harmful Transplant. You have two ways of saving five individuals 
froi_n. dying of organ failure: (1) remove the organs of one healthy 
1nd1v1dual and transplant them into the five, or (2) run over four healthy 
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individuals who are trapped in the road that you would need to drive over 
to get organ-failure-preventing drugs to the five. 
Less Harmful Terrorism. The only way to save five from being killed by a 
cannon is to drop bombs that will have two effects: (a) destroy the 
cannon's ammunition and (b) demoralize the terrorists operating the 
cannon into surrendering by killing some of four innocent bystanders they 
care about, where both (a) and (b) would be sufficient by itself to save the 
five. Suppose that if you (1) drop your bombs with an intention of killing 
one bystander, a mind-reading demigod will shield the other three from 
your bombs and you will kill only one, but if you (2) drop your bombs 
with the intention merely of destroying the ammunition, the demigod wi ll 
leave the three unshielded and you will kill all four. 11 
A theory according to which there are constraints against inflicting only 
intended harms (which are strong enough to make it wrong to harvest one 
individual 's organs to save five) would in these cases tell us to take option 
2 and save the five by kill ing four individuals instead of only one. 12 But 
the mere fact that by killing the four we could avoid having a problematic 
intention towards the one is a preposterously narcissistic justification for 
killing three additional individuals. If we are not permitted in these cases 
to inflict lethal harm on the one with the intention of doing so, then we 
cannot be permitted to do what we foresee will certainly kill the four 
either. 13 
3. Constraints Against Only Proximal or Identifiable 
Harm? 
I have thus argued that plausible theories of agent-centered constraints 
on harming must apply these constraints to some harms that are foreseen 
but unintended. As I mentioned, one might still deny that constraints on 
harming apply to harms caused by butterfly effects by holding that these 
constraints make it more difficult to justify actions only if they are 
"proximal" causes of harm, or one can foresee who the victims of the 
actions will be. 14 But it seems quite implausible that how proximally an 
action causes harm, or whether one can identify its victims, matters in 
itself, quite independently of this indicating a greater risk of causing harm. 
Consider: 
Greater Distal Harm. You have two ways of saving five from drowning: 
(1) drive straight, which will kill one when you drive over a platform, the 
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depression of which will crush her, or (2) take an alternate road which 
wil.I kill ~our when you drive over a different platform, the depre~sion of 
which will crush them. But while the four are located directly under the 
second platform, the depression of its top half will kill them by setting off 
an elaborate Rube-Goldberg device with hundreds of causal intermediaries 
that will eventually cause the downward movement of its bottom half 
which will crush them. ' 
M_ore Unknown Victims. You have two ways to prevent the sadistic 
dictator Pedro from shooting five innocents: (1) shoot one other innocent 
yourself, or (2) press a button that will select four other innocents from a 
databank of everyone in the world and send reliable kill-bots after them 
which you know with certainty will kill the four. ' 
A theory of constraints that applied only to proximally caused harms or 
h~rms with known victims (and was strong enough to make it wrong to 
dnve over one to save five) would in these cases tell us to take option 2 
and save the five by killing four individuals instead of only one. 15 But the 
~ere fac.t ~hat we would kill the four by a longer sequence of causal 
mtermedianes or that we don't know who they will be are ridiculous 
reasons to kill three additional individuals. If we are not permitted in these 
cases to proximally cause the death of the identifiable one we cannot be 
permitted to distally cause the death of the possibly unidentifiable four 
either. 
4. Plausible Constraints Against Distal Harm 
I have thus argued that plausible theories of agent-centered constraints 
0~1 harming must hold that they apply to causing some merely foreseen 
distal harms to unknown victims. But these theories are directly vulnerable 
to the butterfly e!fect argument. I should emphasize that there are many 
forms such theones can take. Some will hold that it is difficult to justify 
harms so long as they counterfactually depend on events that constitute 
our aclions. 16 These .wil.I ~akc all the harms in BH(A) difficult to justify, 
and consequently unJust1f1ed by the roughly equal benefits in BB(A). 
Othe.r theories of c?nstraints against merely foreseen, distally caused 
harm ~111 h?ld s~methmg mor~ like the vi~w that it is difficult to justify a 
harm if one s actions produce 1t, or there 1s a continuous, transitive chain 
of causal events linking one's action to the harm. 17 Since some harms in 
BH(A) will not be produced by A, these theories may allow some harms in 
BH(A) to be j ustified by equally great benefits in BB(A). But it is 
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reasonable lo believe that for any act A that will sustain our lives, some 
lethal harms in BH(A) will be produced by A- this, after all, is the way 
butterflies' wings kill the victims of the tornadoes they set off. Moreover, 
since the expected benefits in BB(A) are equal to the expected harms in 
BH(A), for BB(A) to j ustify BH(A), each harm in BH(A) must be justified 
by a corresponding benefit of equal magnitude in BB(A) . In particular, 
each harm in BH(A) that is produced by A must be justified by a 
corresponding benefi t of equal magnitude in BB(A)-since all other 
benefits in BB(A) are already needed to j ustify the harms in BH(A) that are 
not produced by A. So, since theories which posit constraints against 
producing distal harm entail that these harms in BH(A) that are produced 
by A cannot be justified by equal or somewhat greater benefits, they too 
will entail that the benefits in BB(A) cannot justify the harms in BH(A). 
The same logic applies to more elaborate theories o f constraints against 
causing distal harm. Some, for instance, wi ll have "distributive exemptions" 
for actions that cause harm to some individuals with the same materials or 
forces that would have caused harm to others had they not been 
performed.18 While some lethal harms in BH(A) may be caused in this 
way, the pervasive nature of buttcrn y effects makes it reasonable to 
believe that there will be other lethal harms in BH(A) that are not caused in 
this way (l ike deaths caused by tornadoes that wouldn ' t have formed had 
one not acted), making it impossible for BH(A) to be enti rely justified by 
BB(A). Other theories may hold that benefits cannot easily justify harms if 
elaborate explanatory relations accumulate between them. For instance, 
Frances Kamm proposes that a benefit cannot easily justify causing a harm 
if "something-[the] means [to lhe benefit]- brings along with it causes 
fan effect on a victim th al harms her] either d irectly or by overlapping 
with the di rect cause of flhi s effect]." 19 But whatever one takes the distally 
caused harms to be that are difficul t to justify, the drastic nature of 
butterfly effects makes it reasonable to believe that some of these wi ll be 
in BH(A), making it impossible for BB(A) to entirely justify BH(A). For 
instance, it is reasonable to believe that some of your actions will cause 
lethal disasters, but that some aspects o f these disasters will cause lives to 
be saved later on- which fits Kamm 's criterion for actions, the le thal 
harms of which cannot be justified by their li fe-saving benefits. 
5. Is this an Argument for Universal Suicide? 
I have thus argued that, given the likelihood that our actions wi ll have 
butterfly effects, all plausible theories of agent-centered constraints on 
harming entail that for any way we could sustain our lives, it is reasonable 
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t~ expect tI_iat it will i~vol_ve at least N ~ l instances of difficult-to-justify 
killing, which are not JUStlfied by the corresponding N lives that it can be 
reasonably expected to save.20 Now any theory of agent-centered 
constraints strong enough to make it wrong to kill one individual in the 
difficult-to-justify way to save five others will entail that we are not 
permitted to kill N individuals in the difficult-to-justify way to save N+l 
others. Moreover, any plausible theory of constraints on harming will 
apply them to cases where we would be one of the beneficiaries o f the 
harming-and consequently will not permit us to kill N individuals in the 
difficult-to-justify way to save N other individuals and ourselves. If, for 
instance, we are morally prohibited from harvesting the organs of one 
person to transplant into lwo others, then surely we remain morally 
prohibited from doing so if we are one of the two who need organs. So any 
theory of agent-centered constraints on harming that is strong enough to be 
plausible will not permit us to perform a set of acts that would sustain our 
lives, even though this would save our lives and the lives of N others, if it 
would in a difficult-to-justify way kill a different group of N individuals. 
Since, as l have argued, on any plausible theory of agent-centered 
~onstraints, the butterfly effects of our actions make it overwhelmingly 
likely that any set of acts that wou ld sustain our Ji ves will involve at least 
N . ins_tances of killing lhat are difficult-to-justify and consequently 
unJUSt11ied by the fact thal it will save our lives and those of N others, any 
otherwise plausible theory of agent-centered constraints will not permit us 
to sustain our lives. It will require us either to let ourselves waste away or 
ki ll ourselves.21 
If I am correct that, because of the likely butterfly effects of our 
actions, all otherwise pl ausible theories of agent-centered constraints on 
harming require us either to allow ourselves to waste away or ki ll 
ourselves, what should we conclude? Should we conclude that there are no 
agent-centered constraints on harming, or should we conclude that we are 
in fact morally required to let ourselves waste away or kill ourselves? A 
moral theory should not be dismissed simply because it entails that, given 
our contingent circumstances, we are all morally required to let ourselves 
die or kill ourselves.22 But there seems to be something absurd about the 
view that we must waste away or kill ourselves simply because of the 
harms that would be wrought by the unpredictable butterfly effects of our 
actions, when we can reasonably expect these butterfly effects to prevent 
comparable amounts of harm, and we can live our lives in ways that are 
predictably beneficial to others and can consequently be expected to do 
more good than harm on the whole.23 The implausibility of the idea that 
the unpredictable harms our lives are likely to cause cannot be justified by 
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the fact that that our lives are likely to prevent even greater harms seems to 
illustrate the direct implausibility of the view embodied in otherwise 
plausible constraints on harming-namely that such factors as whether a 
harmful upshot of our conduct was produced by our actions or would have 
occurred in their absence make a significant intrinsic moral difference.24 
So I think we should continue to believe that we are not morally required 
to waste away or kill ourselves, and conclude from my argument that there 
are no agent-centered constraints on harming. 
The great irony is that it is the view that kill ing is worse than letting 
die, rather than the view that letting die is just as bad as kill ing, that seems 
to make morality too demanding. 
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Notes 
1 The example is from Lorenz 1972. For a systematic introduction lo chaos theory, 
see Hilborn 200 I. 
2 Cannon 2003, 145. 
3 The basic idea of this argument was suggested to me by Allan Gibbard. I am also 
grateful to John Ku for many extremely helpful discuss ions o f it. But any problems 
with the argument as I develop it here should be attri buted entirely to me. 
4 That is, under conditions where we can reasonably assign probabilities to the 
various possible outcomes of our conduct, but we cannot know these outcomes 
with certainty. See Kagan 1989, 87-91 and Jackson and Smith 2006. 
5 Besides applying only to absolute constraints on harming, another limitation of 
Kagan, Jackson, and Smith's arguments is that they allow defenders of constraints 
to avoid the conclusion that constraints require paralysis by applying constraints 
only in cases where the probability of causing harm exceeds a certain threshold 
(see Kagan 1989, 90n5; Jackson and Smith 275-278; and Aboodi et al. 2008. 
Jackson and Smith argue that this response is problematic, to which Aboodi et al. 
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respond). But because keeping ourselves alive seems overwhelmingly likely to 
cause harmful butterfly effects somewhere down the line, the probability of 
causing harms, to which my argument appeals, seems to surpass any thresholds for 
the application of constraints to which their defenders might appeal. 
6 See Foot 1967. 
7 See Foot (1 967, 1984), as well as (among others) Thomson (1976, 2008), 
Donagan ( 1977), Hanser ( 1999), Vihvel in and Tomkow (2005), Draper (2005), 
Kamm (2007), and Rickless (2011). Even authors like Quinn ( l989b) and 
McMahan (2009), who believe that there are stronger constraints against intended 
harming than foreseen harming, still accept that there arc constraints against 
certain ways of in fl icting foreseen but unintended harms, which entail that the 
infliction of these harms cannot be justified simply by the equal or somewhat 
greater benefits of in flicting them (see Quinn l 989a and McMahan 1993). 
8 See Mack ( 1985); Aboodi c t al. (2008, 267); and Pruss (20 13, 50). 
9 To see this, observe that in such a case if the one were somehow to survive the 
removal of her organs, you would have cause to rejoice. This point has been noted 
in the literature at least since Hart 1967, and was well d iscussed by Foot ( L967, 2 1-
22), Russell ( 1977, 95-96), and Bennett ( 1981, 110-l lJ ; 1995, 210-213). For a 
version of the Doctrine of Double Effect that seems to embrace this conclusion, sec 
Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle 200 I. (Note, moreover, that it wou ld be implausible to 
think that there is a serious constraint against causing intended "harms" like mere 
organ removal, independent of their lethal consequences. If the only way to save 
five from dying was to remove the organs of one, but the procedure was 
guaranteed to be painless, intsude in no way into the life of the one, and result in 
the one having better organs that would cause her to live longer than she would 
have with the organs we removed, I think that there could be no serious moral 
objection to removing her organs to save the five. At the very least, the objection 
could be nowhere near as strong as the one there seems to be to lethally removing 
her organs). 
10 This is because any effect on the individual's body plays no causal role in your 
saving the live-you would have saved them just as well if she fai led to instantiate 
any properties at all. For thi s kind of interpretation of the constraint against causing 
intended harm see Mack 1985; Quinn l 989b; Shaw 2006, 69-7 1; and Mikhai 1 
2007, 145; 20 11, 133-1 36, 148-152. Quinn at least was well aware that such 
constraints would not by themselves prohibit runn ing over one to save five, but in 
addition LO them he defended constraints against causing certain uni ntended harms 
( I 989a), which would not permit us to run over one to save five. 
11 One might worry that the intentions with which you drop your bombs arc not 
within your voluntary control, so ( I) and (2) are not legitimately distinct options in 
Less Harmful Terrorism (see e.g. Ross 1930, 4-6; Bennett 198 1, 96-98; 1995, 194-
196; and Scanlon 2008, chapter 2). This actually constitutes an important objection 
to the view that there are constraints against infl icting only intended harms, but it 
is not the objection I am presenting here. We can, for my purposes, assume that 
your intentions are under your voluntary control in Less Harmful Terrorism-say, 
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because you have pills that you can take that you know will induce the relevant 
intentions. 
12 Such a theory would forbid us from taki ng option l (s ince it would involve 
inllicting intended harm) and permit us to take option 2 (since the harm it inllicts is 
not in tended and it does more good than harm). It would , moreover, treat opti on 2 
as more strongly favored by moral reasons than simply not saving the five in the 
same way that we would commonscnsically treat saving fi ve as more strongly 
favored by moral reasons than saving four instead. 
13 Fitzpatrick (2006) might try saying that in these cases, the e vents of your car 
moving where it does or your bombs exploding where they do-which you 
intend- "constitute" the death or lethal injury of the four, so the choice is actually 
between more o r less intended harm rather than between more fo reseen harm or 
less intended harm. It is, however, preposterous to say that the event of the four 
dying is identical to, or constilllted by, the event o r your car moving where it does 
or your bombs exploding where they do. The fo rmer could take place several 
minutes or hours arter the lauer and at completely different locations (ir the four 
were rushed to hospital). Moreover, it docs not matter whether an intended event 
"constitutes lethal injury" so long as it is equally sure to ki ll its victims. Suppose 
that instead o r driving over the four or blowing up the cannon's ammo, you could 
hire a giant to get the medic ine to the f'i ve or destroy the cannon's ammo by te ll ing 
him the hid ing place o r the four, who he would very much like to cat. Obvious ly, 
you need not here intend any injury to the fou r, but if telling the g iant about their 
hiding place is just as sure to kill them as driving over them or exploding bombs in 
their vici nity, it is no easier to justi ry. 
14 For suggestions along these lines, see the ordinary causal claims described in 
Hart and Honore ( 1985), M oore (2009), and Pruss (20 13, 6 1-63). 
15 Such theories would forbid us from taking option I (since it would involve 
inllicting proximal harm, o r harm to identifiable victims) and permit us to take 
option 2 (since the harm it inllicts is not proximal or to known victims, and it docs 
more good than harm). These theories would also treat option 2 as more strongly 
favored by moral reasons than simply not saving the ri ve in the same way that we 
would commonscnsically treat saving five as more strongly favored by moral 
reasons than saving four instead. 
16 Tn contrast to harms-like those that result from our simply fai ling to save 
others-that countcrfactually depend only on those reaturcs of our conduct that 
constitute omissions, or non-occurrences o r events that would have constituted 
actions on our parts. Something li ke thi s is the most natural way or understanding 
Donagan' s ( 1977) view, Quinn 's ( 1989a, 294) initial suggestion for c larifying the 
DOA (before he incorporated elements concerning wrongful omissions), and 
Vihvelin and Tomkow's (2005) view. 
17 On the di stinction between production and other kinds of causation, see Hall 
2004. Theories of agent-centered constraints that apply them primari ly to 
something like harms produced by one's actions include those of Hanser ( 1999), 
Draper (2005), and Rickless (2011) (although Rick less (79-8 1) seems to describe 
some events-like removing a trap-door that is preventing someone from being 
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hanged (but ~.o~ ~emoving a laser-beam that is preventing someone from being 
hanged)- as 1111tJat111g causal sequences" that lead to harm even when they are not 
producers of harm; the basis of his categorization is unclear and seems to have 
been influenced by salience). 
18 s 
ee Thomson 1976, 1985-although Thomson (2008) has since rejected this 
idea. 
19 Ka~ ~~07, 149. I do not mean to suggest that this has even the slightest sh red 
?f plaus1bl11ty as a theory of agent-centered constraints. r mention it only to 
1ll ust~ate the pornt that whatever one takes to be the principled distinction between 
~he .distal harms that are (as opposed to the d istal harms that arc not) d ifficult to 
~~st1fy, the bu tt~rfly effect argument wi ll still apply. 
. Note that N is not necessari ly the number of lethal harms in BH(A), since as I 
discussed a theory of constraints might hold that some of these harms are not of the 
kind that cannot be justified by equally important life-savings in BB(A). If so, then 
the expected numb~r o.f lethal harms in BH(A) is N+M, where M is the expected 
number of ea.sy-tO-JUSlify deaths A causes, which are justified by a corresponding 
nu~ber M ol expected life savings in BB(A). Because the M lives saved exactly 
JUSt1fy the M dealJ1s caused, l omit them from discuss ion below for the sake of 
simplic ity. 
21 
Whether the theory of constraints requires us to stay as still as we can until we 
waste away, requires us to acti vely kill ourselves, or permits us to do either, 
d~p~nds up? n ~xact ly which harmful upshots of our bodily processes it counts as 
d1fftcu lt-to-1 ust1fy. For instance, a theory li ke Donagan 's ( 1977, 42-43) might 
count only har.ms that co.u~1tcrfactua lly depend on actions produced in the right 
w~y by our deliberate dec1s1ons. Such a theory would seem to require us to stay as 
s~11l as. we can until we waste away, since any deliberate bodily movements 
(1.ndud 111g ~hos.e involved .in actively hastening our deaths) would risk causing 
d1fficulHo-J USlify harms via butterfly effects, while staying as still as we can is 
guaran~eed no~ to do so. But as Alastair Norcross (2003, 455-456) observes, it 
seems 1mplaus1ble to treat harms as easier to justify if they arc caused by our own 
~easily contr? llable) reflexes, and as Frances Howard-Snyder (20 11, §6) observes, 
1t can sc~m 11nplaus ible to treat certain harms as eas ier to justify even if they are 
caused simply by the position of our own (easily movable) bodies. 
On a view or constraints that counts harms caused by our automatic bodily 
proc.csses or even the positions of our own bodies as difficu lt-to-justiry, simply 
stay111g as still as we can until we waste away would no t be guaranteed to avoid all 
risks of ca~sing difficu lt-lo-justify harms as a result of the butterfly effects of our 
con?ucl. Smee Ll1c .expected harms that wi ll result from the butterfly effects of our 
bodil~ processes will be much less if we stay as still as we can unti l we waste away 
than 1[ we actually sustain our li ves, these views of constraints will hold that 
sus~ai ning our lives is more deeply morally wrong than staying as still as we can 
until we waste away-in the same way that killing five individuals each of whom 
has a d iffer~nt organ you need to survive, is more deeply wrong than killing only 
one of the five. But the expected harms that wi ll result from the butterfly effects of 
our actively killing ourselves may be even less than the expected harms that will 
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result from the butterny effects of our bodily processes if we stay as still as we can 
until we waste away. If (as seems plausible) this is so, then theories of constraints 
that count harms caused by our bodily processes as difficult to j ustify will 
presumably requi re us to actively kill ourselves so as to minimize the amount of 
harm we can be expected to infl ict on od1ers. (Just because running some risk of 
inflicting harm is unavoidable o r permissible does no t mean that we cannot be 
required to minimize the harm we can be expected to inflict by sacrificing our own 
lives. For insta nce, as Philippa Foot ( 1967) and Judith Thomson (2008) wou ld 
presumably argue, if the only way to prevent ourselves from kill ing five 
individuals wi th the tro lley we are driving is to ram it into a wall that will certai nly 
kill ourselves and run some small chance of killing one other innocen t, we would 
be morally required to do so. S imilarly, if the onl y way to save ten billion from 
dying is to either ( I) kil l fi ve individuals or (2) kill ourselves and one other 
individual, it seems plausible that we would be required to take option (2) and kill 
ourselves and the one other.) 
I am grateful to Octavian lon, Bradley Strawser, Jul ie Tannenbaum, and Justi n 
Weinberg fo r very helpful discussion of this issue. 
22 For instance, our contingent circumstances might be so bad that the only way for 
us to save bi ll ions of others from even more painfu l deaths was lo kil l ourselves, in 
which case a moral theory should require us to kill ourselves. 
23 For s implicity I omi tted the benefi ts we can confer on others by acting in 
predictably more beneficial ways in my argument that, because o r the li kely 
butterfly effects of our actions, any plausible theory of agent-cente red constraints 
w ill require us to let ourselves waste away or kill ourselves. To sec why this 
conclusion still fo llows, note that theories of constraints accordi ng to which killing 
is only marg inally harde r to justi fy than letti ng die do not seem plausible. ff killing 
is harder to justi fy, it is much harder-although presumably not impossible-to 
justify. As such, plausible theories o f constraints will permi t us to remain alive 
on ly if the number of others we save by do ing so is much g reater than the number 
we can be expected to kill in difficult-to-justify ways through the buttcrny e ffects 
of our actions (after removing the li fe-savings needed to justify any easy-to-justify 
harms that we inflict over the course of our li ves). The most beneficial lives most 
of us could lead-say working optimally hard in optimally lucrative careers and 
giving our earnings to organizations like Oxfam-might be reasonably predicted to 
save some hundreds or thousands of ind ividuals. But it would seem reasonable to 
expect that, given the sensitive dependence of futu re events on initial conditions, 
such lives will over the course of all future hi story cause un predictable butterfly 
effects that will kill much greater numbers o f individuals in what plausible theories 
o f constraints wi ll regard as difficult-to-j ustify ways (while o f course saving 
s imilar numbers of individuals too). As such, it does not seem that the number of 
individuals one could save by livi ng even the most beneficial li fe possible would 
(after removing the li fe-savings needed to justi fy any easy-to-justify harming) be 
much greater than the number of indi viduals one would kill in ways that p lausible 
theories of constraints will regard as difficult-to-justify. 
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!·I That is lo say, the implausi ble requirement to forgo living lives that would on 
hu lancc do more good than harm simply because of the harms caused by the 
butterfly effects of our actions seems to be more than a mere counter-intuitive 
~onsequ.e~~e of o~erwis~ plausible agent-centered constraints on harming. The 
11~plaus1b1 hty o~ this requirement seems to illustrate a generally implausible aspect 
of t l~ese constramts, considered m themselves and independent of what else they 
email- namely that they place a great deal o f weight on such factors as whether a 
harmful upshot of our conduct was produced by our actions or would have 
occurred in the ir absence, which seem on reflection to be rather arbitrary or devoid 
of significant intrinsic moral importance. 
